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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate an interpreter’s handling of a peculiar participation 
framework used in a Belgian criminal court, i.e. the paternalistic framework (following Tates et al. 
2002), where the defendant is the topic of the interaction, but is mostly treated as an unaddressed 
recipient. One interpreter-mediated trial with asymmetrical interpreting needs was recorded, 
transcribed and analysed. It appeared that the paternalistic participation framework prompts a series 
of strategies by the interpreter, which ultimately leads her to disregard major aspects of the code of 
ethics she is expected to abide by. First, the interpreter sets up a separate participation framework 
with the defendant as an addressee of the interpretation (called the ‘interpreter’s dyad’). The court’s 
interaction is systematically presented according to the deictic framework of the dyad. The interpreter 
also regularly adopts footing as a principal, plausibly as a result of her functioning in her own dyad. 
Paradoxically, even though she operates in an asymmetrical interpreting context, where interpretation 
is only required for the benefit of the defendant, she also regularly interprets for the court, most 
probably to protect the defendant in cases of strong disalignment between the judge and the 
defendant.    
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s and, in particular, the ground-breaking work by Cecilia Wadensjö (Wadensjö 1998), 
various aspects of the communicative pas de trois in which the dialogue interpreter is engaged, have 
been described in detail: interpreter footing (Wadensjö 1995), turn taking (Roy 1996), face work 
(Mason & Stewart 2001, Jacobsen 2008), etc. The research has shown that conduit-models clearly fail 
to provide accurate descriptions of interpreting. Interpreters do more than transfer speaker-controlled 
meaning to another language. They play a role in the interaction and co-construct meaning.  
 
The focus of most of the research has been on standard triadic interactions with two primary speakers 
and an interpreter, where short consecutive interpreting is practised from and into both languages. 
Several studies report the presence and intervention of other speakers during interpreter-mediated 
conversations (Mason 2008; Nakane 2014), but no study addresses the issue directly, with the 
exception of Angermeyer (2005a) and (2015). 
 
In the research on legal and courtroom interpreting, this bias can also be observed and is probably 
responsible for the selective view that is offered of the interpreting profession in that particular context: 
legal systems with oral and adversarial proceedings, such as New Zealand (Fenton 1997), the United 
States (Berk-Seligson 1990; Angermeyer 2005b, Mikkelson 2008 inter alia) and Australia (Hale 2004) 
are clearly privileged. In countries with mainly written and inquisitorial proceedings, such as Denmark 
(Jacobsen 2008), Poland (Bednarek 2014) and Belgium (Gallez & Maryns 2014), the research 
concentrates on procedural stages where triadic interaction is found. One important exception is 
Gallez & Reynders (2015), who focus on the monological part of an assize process held in Belgium. 
Though triadic interaction is probably the most prototypical form of interpreter-mediated interaction and 
probably also the least complex to describe, the one-sided focus on triadic instances has kept other 
configurations out of sight. 
 
The Belgian legal system, with the exception of Assize Courts, favours inquisitorial proceedings, in 
which interaction between the parties is kept to a strict minimum. Cases are handled according to a 
set of conventions favouring long uninterrupted turns by the prosecutor, the solicitor and the judge, in 
which they all speak about the defendant, rather than address the defendant directly. This type of 
interaction has been called “paternalistic” in the medical field (Tates et al. 2002). In a fair share of 
cases in which interpreting is requested, it is provided only to the defendant, as the other parties 
involved in the case master the language the defendant speaks. The participation frameworks 
imposed by the rules of procedure and the asymmetric language regime put interpreters in a situation 
which is very dissimilar to situations described in the literature on court interpreting. Interpreters 
interact in specific, undocumented ways with these working conditions. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate an interpreter’s handling of the participation frameworks and of the asymmetric language 
regime. It will appear that the strategic choices she makes with regard to the interpreting mode and 
her own footing and the rhetorical moves she is the target of all interact to reinforce the paternalistic 
nature of the hearing and force her into breaching important ethical principles governing court 
interpreting both in Belgium but also internationally. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will describe the functioning of a Belgian 
Correctional court highlighting its paternalistic properties, we will describe in detail the procedure 
candidate court interpreters go through to become a sworn interpreter for Belgian courts and disclose 
relevant information regarding the interpreter who is at work in the case at hand. Section 3 provides an 
outline of the case and the basic data for the study. In Section 4 we analyse the interpreter’s handling 
of the case, which will be discussed in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. The Belgian correctional court: procedures and role of interpreting 
 
2.1. Procedures  
 
The Belgian judiciary is organised following four branches of law: social, commercial, civil and criminal 
law. Civil and criminal cases are handled by different chambers of the so-called Court of first instance. 
The case analysed in Section 4 is a criminal case brought before the so-called Correctional chamber 
of the Court of first instance in Bruges. In Belgium, criminal cases may be ruled by police courts, if the 
case is related to traffic, by correctional chambers of the Court of first instance, if the offence is 
punishable with a prison sentence between 8 days and 5 years, and by the Assize Court, if the offence 
is punishable with a prison sentence of more than 5 years. In the Bruges region, according to the Law 
of 1935 on the use of language in the judicial system, trials must be held in Dutch. If the suspect is 
French-speaking, he or she can ask for the trial to be transferred to a French-speaking arrondissement. 
In any other case, interpreting is provided.  
 
A criminal case consists of a pre-trial phase and the trial. The pre-trial phase is inquisitorial: 
investigations are ordered and supervised by a magistrate and are mostly secret. At the end of the 
pre-trial phase, this magistrate presents a written file, which will be the basis of the trial phase, if the 
case reaches that stage. In theory, the trial itself is adversarial, as it allows parties to challenge the 
evidence presented in the investigation file, calling witnesses, questioning the defendant, etc. 
However, as pointed out by Traest (2002), the work load of correctional courts and the heavy reliance 
by judges on the pre-trial phase significantly reduce the adversarial character of the proceedings. 
 
The proceedings of Correctional courts are court-centred: judges allocate turns and actively manage 
the interaction. Parties do not confront one another directly, but challenge each other’s views through 
the judge. The case unfolds according to a scenario established in the Belgian code of criminal 
proceedings, translated as follows by Pesquié (2002): 
 
“The procureur du Roi, the partie civile and his counsel will set out the case; statements 
and reports, if they were made, will be read by the clerk; witnesses for and against will be 
heard if need be and the complaints put forward and judged; evidence to convict or 
discharge will be put to the witnesses and the parties; the accused will be interrogated; 
the accused and the civilly liable persons will state their case; the procureur du Roi will 
summarize the case and give his conclusions; the accused and persons civilly liable will 
have the opportunity to reply. Judgment is given in the same hearing or, at the latest, 
during the hearing that follows the one that concluded the proceedings.” (Pesquié 
2002:113) 
 
These rules of procedure make for a fairly static case, with predominantly monologic discourse 
directed at the judge. The only instances of real interaction occur when the judge questions witnesses 
or the defendant or reacts to statements made by the prosecutor or the defendant’s counsel. 
 
In terms of Goffman’s (1981) participation framework, the court’s setting presents similarities with the 
“paternalistic interview style” identified by Tates et al. (2002). In a “paternalistic interview style”, the 
person who is the topic of conversation is a bystander in the interaction. Typical examples of the 
paternalistic interview style, as described by Tates et al. (2002), are found in medical contexts 
involving a doctor, a child patient and one of the parents. In most of the interactions recorded by Tates 
et al. (2002), the participation framework involves the doctor and the parent as active participants, 
while the child, whose health is being discussed, is only a bystander: s/he is a witness of the 
interaction, but takes no part in it. The same is found in the Correctional court’s proceedings: 
defendants are the main topic of conversation, but their involvement in the interaction is minimal. On 
one occasion only are they ratified as addressees: after the presentation of the evidence, the law 
stipulates that judges question the defendants directly. The latter are then authorised to act as 
principals in the interaction. At all other stages, the defendants’ points of view are presented by their 
legal counsels. In most cases, just before they reach a verdict, judges will ask defendants whether 
they have anything to add to their counsels’ pleas, in which case defendants may again act as 
principals. The rest of the time, defendants do not participate in the interaction. It may be discussed 
whether their main role is that of bystanders or of unaddressed recipients, in Goffman’s (1981) terms. 
The former are individuals that happen to be present at an interaction, overhearing it, but who are not 
ratified as participants; the latter are ratified participants, expected by the speaker to attend to the 
interaction, without being addressed directly. The defendant’s role in a Correctional court fits better 
with the latter description: defendants are expected to attend to the court’s proceedings and are 
provided an interpreter, not only to interact directly with the court, but also to be able to follow the 
proceedings. 
 
 
2.2. Court interpreters in Belgium 
 
Court interpreters in Belgium are officially called “sworn” interpreters, as they have to take an oath in 
order to be allowed to interpret for the court. There is no straightforward or uniform procedure to 
become a sworn interpreter in Belgium. Belgium does not have any statutory framework to define the 
legal status of sworn interpreters, their terms of appointment or the procedure for swearing them in. 
Each of the country’s 27 judicial arrondissements observes its own procedures for administering the 
oath to translators and interpreters. Moreover, in blatant breach of EU legislation, Belgium does not 
maintain a national register of sworn interpreters. In each arrondissement, the court of first instance 
maintains its own list of translators and interpreters whose oath is recognised in that territory. As the 
case at hand focuses on a criminal case heard at the correctional court in Bruges, we will outline the 
procedure applied in Bruges. 
 
An interpreter wishing to acquire sworn status must apply to the court of first instance in the judicial 
arrondissement where he or she resides. The applicant must be 21 years of age or over; be a citizen 
or legal resident of an EU member state; and must have no criminal record. To their applications, 
candidates must append copies of their certificates and diploma and any other documents proving 
they have a proper command of the language(s) for which they seek sworn status. Often, it is sufficient 
for candidates to sign a declaration that they are native speakers of a particular language. Linguistic 
skills are not tested. There are no further requirements as regards diplomas: candidates are not 
required to prove that they have taken interpreting classes or have legal knowledge of any kindi. The 
situation very much resembles the state of court interpreting in Italy, described in Garwood (2012). 
Having submitted their application, candidates undergo a criminal record check by the local police. If 
the outcome is positive, the application is submitted to a general session of the Court, which can either 
accept or reject it. In case the application is accepted, candidates are invited to attend a public session 
of the Court to swear the following oath: Ik zweer getrouwelijk de gezegden te vertolken, welke aan 
personen die verschillende talen spreken, moeten overgezegd worden.“ [translation: ‘I swear that I 
shall interpret faithfully those utterances that must be repeated for persons who speak different 
languages’]. Having sworn the oath, candidates sign a declaration in the civil registry of the Court and 
are issued with a copy of their oath. Their names are herewith added to the list of sworn 
translators/interpreters of the court of first instance. Note that the court does not distinguish between 
translators and interpreters: candidates apply for both statuses at once and it is up to them to decide 
whether they wish to become active interpreters.  
 
Sworn interpreters must abide by a code of ethics the court imposes on them. The code of ethics 
consists of ten articles regulating the recommended general and professional conduct, independence 
and impartiality, trustworthiness and confidentiality. With regard to the interpreting activity, interpreters 
are required to assess their competence for a particular task and to interpret completely and 
accurately. More specifically, they must include in their interpretation any insulting vocabulary used by 
the speakers and render non-verbal properties of the source texts, such as intonation and emotions of 
the speaker. They should not embellish the source text nor omit any part of it, even when they are 
aware that what the speaker says is mistaken or untruthful. On all these points, the Belgian code of 
ethics is quite similar to the ethical rules applied in other countries. There is one noticeable difference, 
however: the Belgian code of ethics does not explicitly require interpreters to abide by the first-person 
rule, i.e. to adopt the speaker’s deixis. The Belgian case is thus an exception to a rule that is claimed 
to be universal by some (Christensen 2008). It may be argued that the first-person principle is 
subsumed under the accuracy requirement, as Mikkelson (2000) suggests, but the fact that in many 
codes an explicit reference to the first-person principle is made, in addition to the accuracy 
requirement, suggests that the status of both principles is different. In the United States, for instance, 
the first-person principle is explicitly stated, not for the purpose of accuracy, but because the verbatim 
transcripts of the trials may only be drafted in English. To represent witnesses’ statements made in 
any language other than English (Angermeyer 2005b), the verbatim transcript is therefore based on 
the interpretation, which is, in turn, expected to reflect the statements from the point of view of those 
who made them. Being much less adversarial than its American counterpart, the Belgian judicial 
system does not keep verbatim records of trials, which might explain why an explicit instruction about 
the use of first person reference is absent from the code of ethics.  
 
With regard to the actual interpreting practice during trials, it should be noted that, when they feel that 
they can understand the language the defendant uses, judges usually confine the interpreter to 
working for the defendant exclusively. In practice, this means that an asymmetric language regime is 
nearly systematically applied whenever the defendant speaks English or French, in which the 
interpreters only interpret into the language of the defendant, which is mostly not their A-language.  
 
Clearly, the combination of lack of formal interpreter training in court interpreting, paternalistic 
interaction, court-centeredness and asymmetric interpreting poses specific challenges both to the 
interpreter and the participants. We shall see that the specific interaction framework of the court puts 
the interpreter in a very peculiar position, which forces her to make strategic choices that eventually 
backfire at her. On the one hand, the court’s paternalistic mind frame is so strong that it spills over into 
the interpreter-mediated interactions with defendants, reducing defendants to the role of unaddressed 
recipients, where they should be addressees. On the other hand, the judge’s overt use of a powerful 
interaction management style causes the interpreter to breach crucial principle of the code of ethics 
she is expected to abide by.  
 
 
3. The data of the present study 
 
The data used in the present study are drawn from a recorded hearing at the Correctional court in 
Bruges (Belgium) in the first months of 2014. The case at hand concerns two French suspects found 
in possession of an illegal quantity of hard drugs. Their cases are heard separately but in succession. 
The first suspect speaks French and requested interpreting into that language. The second suspect 
speaks French and Arabic and requested interpreting into Arabic. We will focus on the first suspect’s 
hearing exclusively. The interpreter who works for the French defendant is a trained interpreter, 
though not specifically trained in court interpreting, with more than 10 years of experience in the field. 
As is usual with a French-speaking defendant, she works almost exclusively for the defendant, as the 
other participants all understand French, but are not allowed to actively use it.  
 
The data were described according to the conventions defined in Jefferson (2004). In order to account 
for the interpreting mode, we decided to derogate on one particular point from Jefferson’s conventions, 
i.e. the numbering of the transcript lines. Interpreter’s lines are given a primed number whenever the 
interpreter performs simultaneous (whispered) interpreting. When the interpreter interprets in 
consecutive mode, the lines are numbered normally. In excerpt (1), for instance, the interpreter’s (I) 
consecutive intervention in 205 has received a line number of its own. Her intervention in 207’ and 
208’, on the other hand, has been given primed numbers, because she interprets simultaneously with 
the speaker. The square brackets signal the starting point of the overlap between the speaker and the 
interpreter. For the sake of clarity, the English glosses have not been numbered.  
 
(1) 
205 J en ze woont daar all:een 
  ‘and she lives there all by herself’ 
 206 I °vous y habitez seul° 
  ‘do you live there all by yourself’ 
 
207 P oui 
  ‘yes’ 
 
208 J en (.) hebt ge nog >[familie vrienden euh zussen of broers↑< behalve uw  
  ‘and (.) do you have other relatives friends er sisters or brothers other than your 
 
208’ I    [vous avez encore de:euh de la fam,ille frères sœurs 
    ‘do you have other relatives brothers sisters’ 
 
209 J ou:ders die dat geld gestort hebben↑ 
  ‘parents who wired the money’ 
 
209’ I sauf vos parents↑ 
  ‘besides your parents’ 
 
 
The hearing is part of a series of hearings concerning one and the same case. Cases can indeed 
easily be spread out over different hearings and it is common practice in Belgian courts to at least 
adjourn the ruling itself to a later date. The recorded hearing starts with the prosecutor (Procureur du 
Roi) summarizing the case and ends with the adjournment of the verdict by the judge. The hearing 
lasts for 28 minutes and unfolds along traditional paths.  
 
The prosecutor initiates the hearing with a summary of the facts and statements of the case and ends 
after 11 ½ minutes with a proposal for punishment (lines 42-43). Then the first defendant’s counsel 
takes the floor for 6 minutes (lines 48-130), reaching a different conclusion. The counsel’s turn ends 
when the judge recalls a procedural issue. After a brief exchange which is cut off by the judge, the 
judge offers the defendant the floor and subsequently starts questioning her (135-224). Finally, she 
announces the adjournment and has a brief exchange with the defendant’s counsel before closing the 
hearing (line 241).  
 
All participants, with the exception of the interpreter and the defendant, speak Dutch. The defendant 
speaks French and the interpreter both French and Dutch. Interpretation is provided to the defendant 
only, as all other parties understand French. There is ample evidence of the judge reacting adequately 
to statements made by the defendant in French. On four occasions, however, one or several turns of 
the defendant are interpreted from French into Dutch. This sudden change in interpreting strategy will 
be shown in the Section 5 to be partly due to rhetorical moves made by the judge.  
 
The participants rhetorical goals are fairly straightforward: the prosecutor seeks to convince the judge 
that the defendant should be punished with a prison sentence for possession of drugs. Although the 
sale of drugs is not part of the indictment, she stresses that the quantities of heroin and cocaine found 
are too important to be merely meant for personal use and that, considering her very limited financial 
resources, the defendant invested an unusually large amount of money in the purchase of drugs. The 
defendant’s counsel argues, instead, that the drugs were purchased for personal use. The unusually 
large quantities she purchased are due to the season: during the Christmas holidays the defendant 
finds it more difficult to travel to Belgium. Her cooperation with the police, her clean criminal record, 
the fact that she is clean of heroin, though still on a methadone programme and that she is looking for 
a job justify in her view a suspended sentence. Finally, the judge’s rhetorical goals appear most clearly 
while she questions the defendant: on the one hand, she seeks to have the defendant admit that it is 
unusual for someone with a low income and following a methadone programme to be in the 
possession of so much heroin. On the other hand, she tries to warn the defendant that if she were 
ever to commit a drug related offence again in Belgium, the suspension of the sentence would cease 
and she would immediately be taken to prison.  
 
During most of the case, the interaction format is paternalistic: participants discuss the defendant’s 
case using 3rd person items to refer to the latter. In excerpt 2, for instance the prosecutor (MP for 
ministère public) refers to the defendantsii, using the lexical expression de beklaagden (‘the accused’). 
 (2) 
1 MP  de beklaagden dienen [zich voor de rechtbank te verantwoorden (.) wegens (.) 
  ‘the accused need to answer before the court for’  
 
This paternalistic framework bears a close resemblance to some of the cases discussed in 
Angermeyer (2005a) and (2015), where witnesses are questioned about facts that concern the 
defendant. In our case, the paternalistic format even spills over into interaction with the defendant. For 
instance, at one point of his plea, the defendant’s counsel seeks confirmation by the defendant, but 
maintains the third person to refer to her, as shown in excerpt (3), where A refers to the defendant’s 
counsel (avocat):  
 
(3) 
110 A ze mag mij verbeteren als het niet juist is↑  
  ‘she may correct me if that is wrong’ 
 
It is crucial to understand that this utterance is not directed at the interpreter. The interpreter’s role as 
an addressee in interaction is well-documented in the literature on dialogue interpreting (Wadensjö 
1998; Bot 2005), including in a court’s context (Berk-Seligson 1990; Nicholson & Martinsen 1997; 
Christensen 2008), but excerpt (2) illustrates a different case: the counsel does not change the 
paternalistic framework: she maintains the judge as an addressee, while giving the defendant the 
(admittedly purely rhetorical) opportunity to deny. It is clear however that the defendant is not expected 
to keep the turn afterwards.  
 
The more typical form of 3rd person reference in interaction with the defendant is also found: while 
questioning the defendant, the judge constantly changes the participation framework, addressing both 
the interpreter and the defendant successively. Crucially, she does so at major turning points in the 
interaction. The first switch from a defendant-oriented to an interpreter-oriented framework occurs 
when the defendant (P) finally seems to admit that she used drugs and methadone simultaneously. 
The judge (J) then asks for clarification, as shown in excerpt (4).  
 
(4) 
167 P j’avais déjà mon traitement de méthadone↑ (.) simplement↑ 
  ‘I already had my methadone treatment however’ 
168 J >ze had al wat↑< 
  ‘she had what’ 
 
It is unclear whether the request for clarification is motivated by a failure to hear or understand what 
the defendant said. However, as there are no other indications that the defendant cannot be heard 
during her trial, this hypothesis seems unlikely. It is more likely that the judge seeks confirmation of the 
fact that she achieved one of her rhetorical goals, i.e. have the defendant confess that she used both 
substances simultaneously.  
 
The second switch to the interpreter-oriented framework coincides with a major topic shift within the 
questioning phase, as illustrated in excerpt (5). After issuing a severe warning to the defendant about 
what will happen if she is caught once more buying drugs in Belgium, she turns to the interpreter (line 
189) to collect personal information about the defendant. The interpreter’s turns have been removed 
from this exchange as they will be discussed separately.  
 
(5) 
187 J he↓ (.) ge hebt het gezien ge vliegt dan de gevangenis in en het openbaar  
  ‘right as you noticed you’ll be put in jail and the prosecutor’s’ 
 
188 J ministerie vraagt nu wel EEN J:AAR HE 
  ‘office is now requesting a one year sentence’ 
 
189 P (xxx) je n’arrivera pas ça sera pire (.) euh tu vois 
  ‘(xxx) I won’t be able it will be worse (.) you see’ 
 
190 J en wat doet ze nu↑ 
  ‘and what does she do now (for a living)’ 
 
Other abrupt changes in the participation framework occur at the judge’s sole initiative towards the end 
of the hearing. Each instance shows that the judge uses her institutional power to impose different 
participation frameworks onto the other participants, in particular onto the defendant and the 
interpreter. Actually, the judge’s successive moves seem to suggest that she instrumentalises the 
interpreter to a certain extent to achieve her rhetorical goals. In both (4) and (5), she forces the 
interpreter into the role of the addressee right after she closes her argument, as if to give the 
defendant time to think over what she just said or was told.  
 
There are a few instances of standard exchanges between the judge and the defendant, in which the 
judge uses 2nd person reference. One of these instances is illustrated in excerpt (6). Again the 
interpreter’s turn have been left out (inter alia line 206), as they will be discussed separately. Note the 
shift from 3rd person reference in line 204 to 2nd person reference in line 207.  
 
(6) 
205 J en ze woont daar all:een 
  ‘and she lives there all by herself’ 
 
207 P oui 
  ‘yes’ 
 
208 J en (.) hebt ge nog >[familie vrienden euh zussen of broers↑< behalve uw  
  ‘and (.) do you have other relatives friends er sisters or brothers other than you 
 
209 J ou:ders die dat geld gestort hebben↑ 
  ‘parents who wired the money’ 
 
210 P oui j’ai encore euh (.) un frère et une sœur↑ 
  ‘yes I have er (.) a brother and a sister’ 
 
As regards the interpreter, we can safely conclude that she operates in a challenging context for 
several reasons. Firstly, the participation frameworks evolve rapidly and without prior warning at the 
sole initiative of the judge. Secondly, the combination of a paternalistic framework and interpreting 
creates a conflict regarding the interaction status of the defendant: according to the framework, she is 
not to be involved in the interaction as an addressee. On the other hand, as only the defendant listens 
to the interpretation, she is the only possible addressee of the interpreter. As Angermeyer (2005a) and 
(2015) have shown, the interpreter faces a dilemma in cases like these: either maintain the 
paternalistic framework and speak without a clearly defined addressee, or involve the defendant as an 
addressee and create a new participation framework consisting of herself and the defendant, and 
which co-exists with the court’s paternalistic framework. Finally, the linguistic arrangements burden the 
interpreter: on the one hand, as the speakers and addressees in the court’s paternalistic interaction 
share the same language, they can happily ignore the interpreter’s presence and interests. With a few 
exceptions, there is no time for consecutive interpreting: the interpreter is forced to practice whispered 
interpreting in mostly very unrewarding circumstances (Gallez & Maryns 2014). On the other hand, in 
the few instances where a classic triadic interaction would have been possible, i.e. instances where 
the judge questions the defendant as an addressee, no interpretation is carried out for the judge. The 
interpreter rather operates in a sort of semi-triadic context in which she only whispers the turns of the 
judge.  
 
 
4. Interpreter’s handling of the hearing 
 
In the previous section we argued that due to the paternalistic nature of the court’s hearing and the 
asymmetric interpreting regime, the court’s participation framework virtually splits in two sub-
frameworks: the main framework of the court and the framework shared by the defendant and the 
interpreter. This virtual split materializes through the interpreter’s performance: we will successively 
discuss a series of features that show that the interpreter actually opts to operate in a separate dyad 
with the defendant and the deontological consequences this has. 
 
4.1. The interpreter’s dyad 
 
From the onset, the interpreter sets up a participation framework of her own, converting all 3rd person 
references for the defendant into 2nd person references. This is illustrated in excerpt (7), which is an 
extension of excerpt (1), discussed in Section 3. The interpreter’s output is signalled with a primed 
number and the label ‘I’. 
 
(7) 
1 MP  de beklaagden dienen [zich voor de rechtbank te verantwoorden (.) wegens (.) 
  ‘the accused need to answer before the court for’ 
1’ I    [donc vous devez comparaître devant le tribunal↑ (.) 
     ‘so you must appear before the court’   
 
In French, vous can either be a polite form of 2nd person address for one or several people or an 
ordinary 2nd person plural. As pointed out before, the public prosecutor refers in 3rd person to both the 
defendants. In theory, the interpreter’s 2nd person form could be used for both the defendants, but as 
the other defendant is assisted by another interpreter, it is more likely that the interpreter in excerpt (5) 
addresses the first defendant only. Whichever is the case, the crucial feature of the interpreter’s 
intervention is that she transforms the court’s paternalistic participation framework into a standard 
dialogic one, addressing the defendant(s) directly and she does so throughout the entire hearing. She 
thus creates a separate dyad between herself and the defendant as an addressee.  
 
The transformation of the participation framework in itself is not so unusual : the literature on dialogue 
interpreting mentions a series of similar cases, where interpreters convert participation frameworks 
involving them as addressees into normative frameworks (Wadensjö 2004; Bot 2005; Chang & Wu 
2009, Nakane 2014, Gallez & Maryns 2015). In Angermeyer (2005a) and (2015), cases are reported 
where interpreters transform the participation framework in exactly the same way, when the defendant, 
for whom they are interpreting, is an unaddressed recipient of the interaction. Angermeyer argues that 
they do so because they seek to fulfil the expectations of lay participants in the framework. However, 
in the cases discussed, the interpreter explicitly signals the new participation framework by means of 
an introductory clause signalling reported speech.  
 
According to the sworn interpreters we interviewed, the transformation of the participation framework 
is standard practice in Belgian courts. Interpreters do not see a particular reason why they proceed in 
such a way, other than “it has always been like that”. Corroborating evidence of this widespread 
practice can be found in Gallez & Reynders (2015), where an interpreter in an Assize court seems to 
apply the same strategy.   
 
Further evidence of the interpreter’s creation of a separate dyad can be found in the way the world 
outside the dyad is represented. Unsurprisingly, the court’s interaction is “displayed” (Wadensjö 1998) 
rather than “replayed”: the court’s deixis is replaced by the interpreter’s dyad deixis: 1st and 2nd person 
references are rendered in 3rd person, as in excerpt (8): 
 
(8) 
118 A euhm ik zou u willen vragen <om in uw vonnis> ook de teruggave van die 
  ‘I’d also like to ask you to order in your ruling the restitution of the’ 
118’ I     <elle demande> (.) <donc  
      ‘so she asks   
 
119 A borgsom te willen bevelen (.) euh mijn cliënte is op elke zitting aanwezig  
  ‘bail my client attended all hearings’ 
119’ I à madame le juge> de:euh (.) d’ordonner la restitution, de cette caution puisque 
  ‘the judge to order the restitution of the bail’  
 
On several occasions, the interpreter uses reported speech (indirect representation in Bot’s (2005) 
terms), especially when a brief exchange takes place between the participants of the court’s 
interaction. This is illustrated in excerpt (9), where the defendant’s counsel replies to a comment made 
by the judge: 
 
(9) 
232 J […]      ‘t is da da bezw:arend is↓ 
        ‘that is what is incriminating’ 
232’ I […]        c’est en fait cela  
         ‘that is actually’ 
 
233 A het is wel zo mevrouw de voorzitter (.) het is natuurlijk wel zo dat de prijs van  
  ‘it is also true your honour it is also true that when heroin prices’ 
233’ I qu’elle considère comme étant un délit grave votre avocat dit qu'ici c’est 
  ‘what she considers a serious offence your counsel says that this is’ 
 
Under the Belgian code of ethics for court interpreters, there is no need to adopt the speaker’s deixis. 
However, it should be reminded that this is a trained interpreter who, at some point of her training, 
must have been taught the first-person principle. The strategy she applies here can hardly be 
considered typical of an untrained interpreter, as is sometimes claimed (Pöchhacker 2004). It cannot 
be explained either by some sort of speech community identification between the interpreter and the 
defendant, as is claimed by others (Anderson 2002; Dubslaff & Martinsen 2005), because the 
interpreter is a native speaker of Dutch and performing retour interpretation for the defendant. It is 
probably not due either to the interpreter’s assumed uneasiness in assuming the voice of powerful 
participants, as claimed by Ng (2013), as excerpt (9) illustrates a case where an utterance of the 
defendant’s counsel is tagged with a reported speech prefix. Though probably more powerful than the 
defendant, the counsel is clearly not the powerful voice in court. Rather, the interpreter’s aim seems to 
draw a clear demarcation line between the dyad she sets up with the defendant and the participation 
framework of the court.  
 
The interpreter also describes events that are taking place. For instance, when the defendant’s 
counsel deposits documents proving that the defendant is actively seeking a job, the interpreter 
describes the scene, as is shown in excerpt (10), lines 80 and 81: 
 
(10) 
77 A ze heeft mij vandaag een bundeltje meegebracht met sollicitaties die zij heeft 
  ‘today she’s given me a file with job applications she has’ 
77’ I d’un emploi (.hhh) aujourd’h:ui vous avez donné des documents à votre avocat  
  ‘of a job today you gave documents to your counsel’ 
 
78 A gedaan ik zal dat neerleggen 
  ‘undertaken I shall deposit that’ 
78’ I qui démontrent que vous av:ez <postul :é> euh que vous recherchez  
  ‘proving that you applied that you’re actively seeking’ 
 
79 I activement un emploi↑ 
  ‘a job’ 
 
(Counsel deposits documents and has a brief exchange with the judge and the registrar) 
 
80 I donc (.) elle dépose ces documents-là↑ donc pour prouv:er (.) euh (.) que vous  
  ‘so she deposits those documents so to prove that you’ 
 
81 I êtes en train de rechercher un emploi↑ 
  ‘are seeking job’ 
 
Actually, the utterance in 80 and 81 is functionally ambivalent. It could be interpreted as an addition 
made by the interpreter acting as a principal, a role that will be highlighted in the next section. 
However, it also partially overlaps semantically with what the defendant’s counsel has just said. 
However it is to be analysed, the linguistic evidence points to the fact that the interpreter presents the 
court as alien to her own deixis: the use of the distal suffix –là (‘there’) at the end of the noun 
documents, on the one hand, and the use of the recapitulating donc (‘so’) both situate the court 
outside of the interpreter’s deixis.  
 
Finally, the existence of an interpreter’s dyad is also confirmed by the way the interpreting proceeds in 
some of the few cases where the defendant’s replies are interpreted. This occurs on four different 
occasions during the exchange with the judge. The fact that they are interpreted is surprising per se, 
as no participant in the courtroom needs interpretation to be able to understand the defendant, but the 
circumstances leading the interpreter to interpret for the court are revelatory. Two of the instances can 
be explained fairly straightforwardly: they occur in the context of the judge’s rhetorical moves 
discussed in Section 3. On two different occasions, the judge specifically addresses the interpreter, 
first to ask for clarification, which the interpreter gives, and then to collect personal information about 
the defendant. In both contexts, the interpreter appears to feel compelled to interpret the defendant’s 
replies in order to conform to the framework imposed by the judge. 
 
The other instances occur in contexts where the judge does not address the interpreter and where 
there is no apparent need to interpret the defendant’s replies. The first instance is a very brief 
interpretation turn occurring after a first confrontation between the judge and the defendant. The turn 
that starts in line 151 of excerpt (11) is the second turn in a row in which the judge addresses the 
defendant directly (ge in 151 being a Flemish equivalent of ‘you’), thus effectively putting an end to the 
paternalistic framework applied up to that moment. In this turn, the judge overtly and strongly disaligns 
with the defendant’s reaction to her first turn, as illustrated in lines 153’ and 154 (kom aan hé ‘come 
on’): 
 
(11) 
151 J <400 EU:RO> (.) en ge moet de f:eesten nog doorm:aken↓ (.) en ge moet al leven 
  ‘400 euros and that was before the Christmas season and you already have to’ 
151’ I  400 euros↑ (.) vous avez acheté pour 400 euros↑ (.) et tu dois encore  
   ‘400 euros and you bought for 400 euros and you still have to’ 
 
152 J van maar <van maar 700 euro↓>   kom:aan he mevrouw↓ 
  ‘live of 700 euros only    come on lady’ 
152’ I passer les fê:tes et vous n’avez qu’un revenu minimum d’insertion de 700  
  ‘spend the holidays et you only have a social benefit of 700’ 
 
153 P mon ami il a aussi un <sal:aire hein> (.) il travaille auprès euh 
  ‘my boyfriend also earns a living right he works at er 
153’ I euros par mois      haar vriend heeft ook een loon  
  ‘euros per month    her boyfriend also earns a living 
 
154 I zegt ze↓ (.) hij werkt↓ 
  she says he works 
  
The interpreter’s reaction shown in bold in line 153’ is remarkable: she interprets the defendant’s reply, 
even though neither the judge nor anyone else in the courtroom needs interpreting and she uses third 
person items to refer to the defendant: haar (‘her’) and ze (‘she’). In addressing the judge, she thus 
applies the paternalistic framework of most of the hearing. This by all interpreting standards 
inexplicable move by the interpreter can however be understood if we analyse it as an attempt to roll 
back the judge’s attempt to impose a semi-triadic participation framework. The seemingly useless act 
of interpreting itself cuts off direct communication between the defendant and the judge. The use of 3rd 
person reference restores the court’s paternalistic participation framework as separate from the 
interpreter’s dyad. Angermeyer (2015) reports that one of the contexts in which 3rd person reference 
seems to occur is in case of a “litigant’s confrontational stance” (p. 94), but he explicitly restricts this 
observation to cases where the interpreter interprets into a language which is not the language of the 
court. In excerpt (11), the interpreter uses Dutch, which is the language of the court. 
 
It is no coincidence that the move made by the interpreter occurs just after a strong disaligning 
comment by the judge. This is indeed also characteristic of the second instance, shown in excerpt (12), 
line 177.  
 
(12) 
175 J ja maar hoe >komt het [dan dat ge nog altijd op (xx) milligram methadon zit↑< 
  ‘yeah but how come you are still on (xx) milligrams of methadone’ 
175’ I    [comment ça se fait que vous avez encore toujours  
     ‘how come you still need’ 
 
176 I besoin de:euh (xx) de méthadone↑ (.) actuellement↓ 
  ‘er (xx) methadone nowadays’ 
 
177 P <bein al:ors euh> je vais commencer à le baisser, puisque tout se passe bien 
  ‘well I am going to start reducing it since things are going well’ 
 
178 I ze gaat dat beginnen afbouwen want het gaat goed↓ 
  ‘she is going to start reducing it because things are going well’ 
 
Again the judge expresses strong disalignment, starting her turn in 175 with ja maar (‘yeah but’) and 
requesting an explanation for the apparently contradictory statements made by the defendant about 
her drug and methadone use. The defendant evades the question in her reply, which is subsequently 
interpreted in 177. There is no objective need for interpreting at that moment. Again, the interpreter’s 
aim seems to be to disrupt the semi-triadic participation framework imposed by the judge. 
 
Although we did not interview the interpreter neither as to what motivated her to start interpreting the 
defendant’s turns on these two occasions nor as to the way in which she carries out the interpretation, 
it seems plausible that (11) and (12) illustrate attempts to restore a clear distinction between two 
interaction frameworks: the court’s framework and her personal dyad with the defendant. In a way, she 
verbally interposes herself between the judge and the defendant. As she does so specifically in cases 
where the former expresses strong disalignment with the latter, her intervention may be interpreted as 
a protective move: interpreting at this stage clearly runs counter the judge’s interests.  
    
 
4.2. Interpreter’s footing 
 
Within the new participation framework she herself sets up, the interpreter is exposed to a greater risk 
regarding her own footing in the interaction. As amply demonstrated in the literature, interpreters are 
expected by the institutions that hire them to act as animators (Wadensjö 1998), i.e. expressing the 
views and thoughts of someone else. Except in some cases, such as requests for clarification, 
brokering culture-specific concepts, they are not allowed to act as principals and express their own 
views and thoughts. There is ample evidence, however, that interpreters also occasionally adopt a 
principal’s position outside areas where they are allowed to do so.  
 
In the previous section, we pointed out that the interpreter systematically uses 3rd person items to refer 
to the participation framework the addressee is not part of: when addressing the defendant, she uses 
3rd person reference for the court (excerpts 8 and 10); when addressing the judge, she does the same 
to refer to the defendant (excerpts 11 and 12). The systematic use of 3rd person reference suggests 
that the interpreter does not act as an animator. Unlike Wadensjö (2004), we will not analyse her 
footing as that of a principal either, because, as far as the content of the turns is concerned, there is 
little that changes from the source turn to the interpreter’s turn, except the deictic reference framework. 
In excerpt (9), the relation is somewhat more complicated, as the interpreter seems to add a turn of 
her own, seemingly describing the scene as a principal. However, as we pointed out, this turn could 
also be understood as a repetition of her interpretation of the counsel’s turn. 
 
There are several instances, where the interpreter acts as a real principal, adding information on her 
own initiative and in defiance of the code of ethics she is expected to abide by. For instance, already 
at the end of the prosecutor’s turn, shown in excerpt (13), the interpreter draws an inference about the 
accusations based on the prosecutor’s request (end of line 44 and line 45).   
 
(13) 
43 MP […]  een verbeurdverklaring (.) van de in beslag genomen gelden↓ 
   ‘a forfeiture of the seized money’ 
43’ I  demandent un (.) emprisonnement <de (.) un an> une amende (.) e:t la  
   ‘request a one year’s prison sentence a fine and the’ 
 
44 I confiscation de l’argent↑ euh (.) donc (.) du profit euh apparemment donc on  
  ‘forfeiture of the money so of the profits er so apparently you are’ 
 
45 I vous impute d’avoir eu:h vendu également des stupéfiants↑ 
  ‘accused of having sold drugs too’ 
 
46 P moi j’ai vendu↑ 
  ‘did I sell’ 
 
47 I je sais pas quelles sont les accusations 
  ‘I don’t know what the accusations are’ 
 
The utterance in 44-45 has no direct connection with the prosecutor’s utterances. It is based on an 
assumption the interpreter makes while hearing the prosecutor request the court to forfeit the money 
found on the defendant. This assumption is wrong, since the defendant is only accused of possession 
of drugs and not of selling drugs. The interpreter signals her inferential reasoning using the evidential 
adverb apparemment (‘apparently’). Her role as a principal is immediately picked up by the defendant 
who reacts with a rhetorical question possibly expressing indignation at what she considers to be a 
false accusation. The interpreter then retracts her previous claim in 47, acting again as a principal.  
 
In total, there are 7 instances during the hearing where the interpreter adopts the principal’s role. 
Interestingly, they seem to occur quite systematically at the end of long turns. Excerpt (13), for 
instance, is situated at the end of the prosecutor’s turn; another intervention occurs at the end of the 
counsel’s turn. The ambiguous case in excerpt (10) occurs when the counsel interrupts her turn to 
deposit documents. 
 
Excerpt (13) illustrates a case where the interpreter can safely be assumed to be brokering cultural 
knowledge for the defendant. In another case, the interpreter acts as a principal telling the defendant 
to sit down, which again is evidence of cultural (or procedural) brokering. This is, however, not always 
the case. In excerpt (14), for instance, she acts twice as a principal in order to protect the defendant 
against incriminating herself (capital letters used to indicate utterances made in loud voice):  
 
(14) 
159 J 25 gram voor de feesten met methadon (.) het verwondert me dat ge hier st:aat 
  ’25 grams for the holidays with methadone I am surprised you are here’ 
159’ I    25 grammes pour les fêtes plus le méthadone 
    ’25 grams for the holidays plus methadone’ 
 
160 P <pas plus le méthadone,> [j’aurais pas mélangé hein j’aurais pas eu:h  
  ‘not plus methadone I would never mix you know I wouldn’t er’ 
161 A          [dat was waarschijnlijk ter vervanging van de drugs 
     ‘that was probably to replace the drugs’ 
 
162 I vous n’avez pas pris les deux en même temps↑  
  ‘you didn’t take the two (substances) at the same time’ 
 
163 P non non 
  ‘no no’ 
 
164 J ja maar hoe komt dat dan (.) da ge bijstand nodig had da ge zo’n 
  ‘yeah but how come you needed assistance how come you’ 
164’ I   mais comment ça se fait en fait que vous êtes  
    ‘but how come you are’ 
 
165 J ontwenningsverschijnselen toonde als ge toch (.) <maar heel weinig heroïne  
  ‘suffered withdrawal symptoms if it was only very small amounts of heroin’ 
165’ I adonnée, que avez eu besoin d’une assistance médicale↑ (.) si vous n'étais  
  ‘addicted that you needed medical assistance if you was only’ 
 
166  pakte↑> 
  ‘you took’ 
166’ I <qu’une consommatrice occasionnelle↑> 
  ‘an occasional consumer’ 
 
167 P j’avais déjà mon traitement de méthadone↑ (.) simplement↑ 
  ‘I was already on my methadone programme however’ 
 
168 J >ze had al wat↑< 
  ‘she was already on what’ 
 
169 I ZE WAS REEDS IN BEHANDELING MET METHADON MAAR IK DENK DUS DAT ZE  
  ‘she was already on a methadone programme but I think that she’ 
170 I BEDOELT DAT ZE HAAR METHADON NAM ALS ZE GEEN DRUGS NAM EN  
  ‘means that she took the methadone when she wasn’t’ taking drugs and’ 
171 I OMGEKEERD, WAARDOOR DAT ZE WEL ONTWENNINGSVERSCHIJNSELEN HAD 
  ‘the other way around so she suffered withdrawal symptoms’ 
172 I OMDAT ZE OOK GEEN [METHADON 
  ‘because she didn’t … methadone’ iii 
 
It should be recalled that this is the part of the exchange between the judge and the interpreter, where, 
although the selling of drugs is not formally part of the indictment, the former tries to get the latter to 
confess that she did not buy heroin for her own consumption, but also to sell it to other addicts. Just 
before the start of excerpt (13) she therefore underlines the quantities that were bought and the 
important amounts of money spent on the drugs, especially compared to the defendant’s income. The 
defendant then tries to minimize both the quantities and the financial impact saying her boyfriend also 
has an income. In the next move, the judge then argues that it is unlikely she could have consumed 
such quantities of heroin in combination with the methadone she already took. The defendant then 
denies she combined heroin and methadone. At that point, both the defendant’s counsel and the 
interpreter step in to prepare a plausible alternative scenario in which the defendant took methadone 
and heroin alternatively. The interpreter first seeks confirmation of this scenario from the defendant in 
162 and when asked for clarification by the judge in 168, delivers the scenario she believes the 
defendant has in mind (169-172). She thereby also cancels her interpretation (first half of 169) of the 
defendant’s last turn that seemingly confirmed the scenario upheld by the judge. 
 
The interpreter’s turns in 162 and 169-172 cannot be accounted for within the generally accepted rules 
governing interpreters acting as principals. 162 is a request for clarification, but not of the sort that 
would be allowed by any code of ethics, as it does not concern the content of the defendant’s turn. It 
directly relates to the facts of the case, which are being co-constructed by the defendant and the 
interpreter. In lines 169-172, the first utterance can be understood as a reaction prompted by the judge, 
who addresses the interpreter directly as a principal in 168. Acting as a principal is accepted practice 
in these circumstances and falls within the scope of the code of ethics. However, the rest of the term is 
a case of inferential reasoning by the interpreter in a clear attempt to cancel the interpretation of the 
defendant’s turn in order to protect the defendant’s interests. 
 
In conclusion, both the creation and hard-fought maintenance of the interpreter’s dyad and the 
interpreter’s acting as a principal seem to be instrumental in protecting the defendant against a 
powerful court. In (13), the inferential reasoning can be understood as a cultural brokering intended to 
empower the defendant by making her more aware of the ins and outs of the judicial procedure. In 
(14), the interpreter successfully takes advantage of a turn allocation by the judge to cancel a self-
incriminating utterance by the defendant. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
It is customary in analyses of interpreter-mediated court cases to speculate on the possible 
consequences of the interpreter’s conduct in the framework of the case. The creation of a separate 
dyad between the interpreter and the defendant clearly gives the latter a distorted image of the nature 
of the court’s interaction and the procedure as a whole. Treating the defendant as a direct addressee, 
the interpreter presents the procedure as more adversarial and less court-centred than it actually is. 
This probably does not change either the course or the outcome of the trial in any way, as the 
defendant’s role is very limited in the case. However, we have also seen that the dyad is used in more 
subtle ways to influence the course of the interaction: when the judge expresses disbelief or issues 
warnings in direct interaction with the defendant, the interpreter struggles to restore the divide between 
her own dyad and the court’s participation framework. This undoubtedly has an impact on the case, as 
it is likely to discourage further direct interaction between the judge and the defendant. 
 
On the other hand, the creation of a dyad is likely to affect the interpreter’s conduct and, more in 
particular, increases the likelihood that the interpreter acts as a principal. Indeed, as she never 
presents the source utterances from the court’s deictic framework, but from the dyad’s, the interpreter 
never acts as a proper animator. From there, the transition to a full-fledged principal role is fairly 
straightforward. It is clear that the interpreter intends her role as a principal to benefit the defendant, 
whether she addresses the defendant, brokering cultural and procedural knowledge, or the judge, 
canceling a possible self-incrimination by the defendant. The first case is unsuccessful as she extends 
wrong information to the defendant. In the second case, the interpreter manages to steer the judge 
away from the self-incriminating claim by the defendant. The methadone, however, is not dropped as a 
topic of conversation.  
 
In sum, by the way she handles her interpreting assignment, the interpreter does have an impact on 
how the trial unfolds. It is true that she breaches crucial provisions of the code of ethics, but the judge 
does not seem to care, as she does not reprimand her one single time during the trial and may even, 
to a certain extent, be held responsible for eliciting the interpreter’s conduct during the trial.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
  
The aim of the present paper was not to call the interpreter’s professionalism into question. Rather, we 
wanted to show how a trained and experienced sworn interpreter performs in a challenging context of 
paternalistic interaction and asymmetric interpreting needs. It appeared that, in reaction to the 
paternalistic participation framework upheld by the court, the interpreter chooses to set up a parallel 
participation framework between herself and the defendant as an addressee. As this participation 
framework only includes two persons, we christened it the “interpreter’s dyad”. It is difficult to assess to 
what extent the court’s framework actually contributes to the creation of the dyad, but the dyad has 
been seen to originate in other paternalistic trials we observed. It thus seems at the least to be a fairly 
regular by-product of paternalistic interaction. 
 
While interpreting, the interpreter represents the court’s interaction based on the deictic framework of 
the dyad. She also regularly adopts the role of principal within the dyad, brokering procedural 
knowledge for the defendant. We hypothesised that the creation of the dyad with its own deictic 
framework facilitates the transition towards a principal status in the dyadic interaction. The interpreter 
also acts as a principal in interaction with the court in an attempt to cancel a possibly self-incriminating 
statement by the defendant.  
 
With regard to the asymmetric interpreting needs, we indeed observe that the interpreter mostly only 
works for the defendant. However, on some occasions, she does also interpret the defendant’s 
utterances for the judge. In only one case, she seems to be instructed to interpret by the judge herself, 
but in all other cases, her interpretation for the court is unasked for. As these instances appear to 
coincide with contexts of strong disalignment in interactions between the judge and the defendant, we 
hypothesised that the unneeded interpretation is a way of protecting the defendant by trying to restore 
the court’s usual paternalistic participation framework. The fact that the interpreter uses third-person 
pronouns in these cases to refer to the defendant confirms this view.  
 
It seems that, in all, the interpreter’s moves can be analysed as unduly protective with regard to the 
defendant. The motives for this display of solidarity are unknown, but the way in which the 
interpretation is carried out may have an impact: creating a dyad with the defendant is likely to tighten 
the relationship between the interpreter and the defendant. Obviously, much more research is needed 
into interpreters’ performances in paternalistic courts to confirm these preliminary findings.  
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i
 The above procedure is that followed for swearing in interpreters or translators in the judicial arrondissements of 
Bruges, Ghent and Leuven. Other arrondissements’ procedures can vary considerably. In the judicial 
arrondissements of Mechelen, Turnhout and Antwerp, for instance, candidates are required to take a language 
test and to take a particular course of study. In these arrondissements, the swearing-in procedure is as follows. 
The candidate seeking sworn status enrolls in the Legal Translation and Interpreting course offered by KU 
Leuven. Before beginning this course, applicants must take a test in written and spoken Dutch. Only those who 
pass that test will be admitted to the course. The course itself takes five months and is made up of a number of 
modules such as legal training and legal terminology. At the end of the course, the student is examined in all 
modules. Only if he or she passes each of the examinations, a certificate in legal translation and/or interpreting is 
awarded. His or her name will then be forwarded to the public prosecutor for an administrative inquiry. He or she 
is then invited to take the oath at the court of first instance; his or her name will subsequently be placed on the list 
of sworn translators or interpreters. There are still other arrondissements in the country that arrange language 
tests for sworn translators and interpreters in partnership with the Belgian Chamber of Translators and 
Interpreters (BKVT/CBTI). The candidate sends his/her application to the court of first instance and will then be 
invited to take an examination at the offices of the BKVT in Brussels. Held twice a year, this examination consists 
of the written translation of a legal text. Successful candidates are given an attestation with which they can 
present themselves at the court of first instance to be sworn in. 
ii
 It is useful to recall that there are two defendants in the case. With the exception of the prosecutor who requests 
punishment for both of the defendants in one single intervention, the defendants’ cases are handled one after the 
other. 
iii
 The interpreter is interrupted at this point by the defendant. She does not pronounce the verb which comes at 
the end of Dutch subordinate clauses. As word order differs between Dutch and English, the English gloss cannot 
run exactly parallel to the Dutch reply: we therefore left the theoretical position of the verb in the middle of the 
English clause vacuous.  
